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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached herewith is a copy of the letter sent to Mr. McNichol, USIA, for your information.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
TSCC 3E-30 Hqs.	12 Dec 68

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

12 December 1968


Mr. Paul J. McNichol
Assistant Director (Security)
USIA

Dear Mr. McNichol:

I refer to your letter dated November 8th, and our subsequent meeting on 21 November in the office of Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, during which we discussed the manner in which USIA could best profit from appropriate activities of this committee and its two subcommittees.


Several years ago the United States Intelligence Board established the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee as one of several committees responsible for handling certain intelligence activities and problems for the Board. It soon became evident that among the activities of the TSCC there are several of interest to a number of government agencies which, although not members of USIB and thus not eligible for representation on the TSCC, are nevertheless concerned with the audio surveillance threat and means for combating it. We have therefore made arrangements to insure that information pertaining to the threat can be made available to appropriate agencies.

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A number of the publications periodically issued by the TSCC may well be of value to your technicians. I am, therefore, sending you under separate cover sample copies of the following types of publications:

a. Technical Information Notice. Issued at irregular intervals, these notices contain general technical information brought to the attention of the TSCC which pertains to audio surveillance and countermeasures. Subjects have ranged from a description of the latest penetration [redacted] [redacted] to the procurement in this country by foreign governments of commercial audio surveillance equipment.

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c. Procedural Guide. Three Procedural Guides have been prepared by the TSCC for use by technical teams when conducting countermeasures surveys, when a hostile penetration is found and when a hazardous situation is discovered.

d. Technical Penetration Report. When a penetration of a US installation is discovered, the TSCC prepares the technical penetration report describing the circumstances of the penetration so that those concerned with the preparation of a damage assessment may be able to prepare such a report.

After you have had a chance to examine the above information, which should shortly be in your hands, I would appreciate your letting me know if such reports are of interest. In that case, your agency will be put on distribution for future material, and I will determine what back issues are still available.

Experience has shown that in the case of audio countermeasures close interagency liaison between professionals on a working level is without a doubt the most effective means of keeping abreast of all the technical aspects of the threat and the equipment available to combat it. Since the Department of State now provides countermeasures support to the overseas activities of your organization, I would imagine that your liaison with Mr. Gentile's technical personnel is keeping your shop well informed of the latest developments. You might find it advantageous to maintain liaison on a working level with other agencies who have active countermeasures programs. Such liaison could include, but not be limited to, the Office of Security of CIA, where your people should be in touch with Chief of the Technical Division.

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You may also find it useful to keep in touch with the equivalent military organizations. I will be glad to furnish suggested points of contact should you so desire.

On the rather rare occasions when exhibitions of audio countermeasures equipment are organized, invitations to attend will be extended to your organization as was the case recently when such an exhibition was held last October.

Should a penetration of your premises be discovered overseas by technical personnel of the Department of State, such individuals will already be familiar with the procedures which would then be followed in order that the maximum amount of operational and technical information on the situation can be developed.

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In the event that your own technicians discover a penetration in this country, similar examinations of the discovered devices can promptly be made. In that case I suggest you call me directly so that the necessary arrangements can be made under whatever security limitations or controls you feel necessary.

I apologize for not having replied more promptly to your letter. As I mentioned, the delay was caused by my absence from Washington until December 9th. Please let me know if there is any further information I can supply or if you can think of any further help we can provide.

Sincerely,

Chairman

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